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Abstract
We challenge the global optimality of one-shot punishments in in-
nitely repeated games with discounting. Specically, we show that
the stick-and-carrot punishment à la Abreu (1986) may not be glob-
ally optimal. We prove our result by investigating tacit collusion in
the innite repetition of a linear Cournot game. We illustrate the ex-
istence of the stick-and-carrot globally optimal punishment for large
cartels, and fully characterise it. Then, we show that for mall cartels,
global optimality may be reached only with two-period punishments.
Keywords: cartel stability, implicit collusion, repeated games
JEL Classication: C73, L13
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1 Introduction
While it is still an empirical question of major importance to establish if
(and how) enterprises do collude, the theory of supergames has certainly
strengthened our understanding of how cartels may be shaped by oligopolistic
interaction. The term supergame was likely coined by Luce and Rai¤a (1957)
when examining repetitions of the prisoners dilemma. Actually , according
to Aumann (1981), it has been known since the middle to late 1960s that
any individually rational payo¤ vector (i.e., not smaller than a payo¤ that
the player can guarantee himself) can be supported as a Nash equilibrium
outcome in an innitely repeated game where there is no discounting . . . ,
and it is this result that he dubs the Folk Theorem(Friedman 1986, p. 103).
However, when switching to impatient players, the strategies forming a
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in supergames without discounting do
not necessarily work. In a pioneering paper, Friedman (1971) proved that
every feasible payo¤ that Pareto dominates a Nash equilibrium of the stage
game is a SPE payo¤ of the innite repetition of the stage game, if players
are patient enough. Friedmans punishment take the simple form of reversion
to the Nash equilibrium of the stage game forever (grim strategy).
This line of research has been furthered by Abreu (1986). He identies a
class of (pure) strategies that support the Folk Theorem in repeated games
with discounting. Such strategies allow one to nd SPE where any individu-
ally rational outcome can be achieved. Moreover, Abreu (1986) has charac-
terized a two-phase punishment as an optimal symmetric punishment which
is more severe than Nash reversion; such a two-phase punishment consists of a
stick-and-carrot strategy. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) have then extended
Abreus results also to games of incomplete information. In Shapiros (1989)
words: Within the class of symmetric punishments, Abreu proves that the
optimal punishment has a simple, two-phase strategy: immediately following
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the defection, each rm participates in a price warby producing a higher
output than previously; but immediately thereafter all rms return to their
optimal, tacitly-collusive output levels. It is striking that, when optimally
punishing a defector, the industry returns after only a single period to the
most collusive sustainable conguration. Abreu describes these types of pun-
ishments as o¤ering a stick and a carrot; apparently, the carrot (returning
to collusion) is necessary to make the stick (the one-period price war) both
credible and as menacing as possible(Shapiro, 1989, p. 368, italics added).
Abreu (1986) also provides conditions under which the symmetric two-phase
punishment is globally optimal.
In this paper we challenge such conditions showing that stick-and-carrot
punishments may not be globally optimal and more than a single period is
then required to enforce a collusive path. As a workhorse we employ the
textbook version of a linear Cournot model as in Abreus (1986, p. 206)
example. We know that: (i) global optimality of punishments requires that
in continuation equilibria rms earn zero prots(Shapiro, 1989, p. 369);
(ii) condition (i) is granted by minmax strategies after deviation from the
cartel, and (iii) minmax strategies are nor subgame perfect in variable-sum
games as ours. Hence, the central issue we are going to tackle deals with the
existence of subgame perfect punishments capable of reproducing the same
critical threshold of the discount factor as under minmax strategies. We
prove that, for small cartels, stick-and-carrot is not a globally optimal strat-
egy and global optimality can be reached only via two-period punishments.
This result belies the validity of Abreus (1986) Theorems 18 and 19. For
large cartels, instead, a stick-and-carrot punishment is globally optimal as it
entails the same critical threshold of the discount factor as under minmax.
Irrespective of cartel size, his example is mistaken.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the setup
and establish the benchmark for the threshold of the discounted factor under
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grim or minmax strategies. In Sections 3 and 4 we get into Abreus analysis
and investigate the optimality of stick-and-carrot punishments. In Section
5 we show under which conditions, for small cartels, global optimality may
be obtained by means of a non stationary punishment lasting two periods.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Setup
Consider a market for a homogeneous good, served by N = 2; :::n identical
single-product rms, endowed with the same technology. Let the market exist
over discrete time t = 0; 1; 2; :::1: All rms share the same intertemporal
preferences, measured by the time-invariant discount factor  2 [0; 1]. In
each period, the inverse market demand function is
p = a 
nX
i=1
qi (1)
where parameter a > 0. The cost function of rm i is Ci = cqi with c 2 [0; a).
Accordingly, the individual prots are
i =
 
a 
nX
i=1
qi   c
!
qi (2)
2.1 Grim trigger and minmax strategies
Consider rst Friedmans (1971) version of the grim trigger strategies, where
collusion is sustained by the threat of an innite reversion to the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of the constituent game. We briey summarise this result
here. Assume perfect tacit collusion with cartel members setting the output
vector so as to maximise joint prots  =
Pn
i=1 i: The resulting individual
collusive output level is qC = (a  c) = (2n) ; granting an individual prot
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C = (a  c)2 = (4n). The unilateral deviation against the n   1 loyal cartel
members is
qD
 
qC

=
(a  c) (n+ 1)
4n
(3)
delivering deviation prots
D
 
qC

=
(a  c)2 (n+ 1)2
16n2
(4)
During the innite Nash reversion, the per-period Cournot-Nash prots are
N = (a  c)2 = (n+ 1)2 : Collusion is stable i¤
  
D   C
D   N  F =
(n+ 1)2
n (n+ 6) + 1
(5)
where F is concave and monotonically increasing in n; with F = 9=17 for
n = 2 and limn!1 F = 1. Treating n as a continuous variable,
@F
@n
=
4 (n2   1)
[n (n+ 6) + 1]2
> 0 (6)
The intuitive message, which has been incorporated in the acquired view on
these matters, is that, in the collusive outcome the per period and per rm
prot is a decreasing function of n. A large number of rms reduces the prot
per rm and thus the cost of being punished for undercutting. In contrast, the
short run gain from undercutting the monopoly price slightly... increases with
n... In this sense market concentration facilitates tacit collusion (Tirole,
1988, p. 248).
If instead the innite punishment consists in each player reverting to min-
max one another through qm = (a  c) =n, the per-period individual payo¤
during the punishment phase is nil and the threshold of the discount factor
ensuring the stability of tacit collusion becomes
  
D   C
D
 m = (n  1)
2
(n+ 1)2
< F 8n (7)
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where subscript m mnemonics for minmax, with m = 1=9 for n = 2 and
limn!1 m = 1. That is, minmax strategies appear to be more e¢ cient than
Nash ones in stabilising the cartel. However, since the constituent game is a
variable-sum one, it is well known that the use of minmax strategies does not
produce subgame perfection. Yet, the threshold of the discount factor m de-
livered by minmax strategies identies the benchmark to be reproduced using
globally optimal punishments which must meet the additional requirement
of subgame perfection.
3 The supergame with optimal punishments
Abreu (1986) aims at nding a one-shot punishment strategy possessing the
properties of being (i) subgame perfect, (ii) more e¢ cient than Friedmans
(1971) Nash reversion, and (iii) globally optimal. Since the stick is harsher
than the Nash strategy, this requires a condition of its own for incentive
compatibility about the implementation of the punishment itself. Moreover,
since the severity of the punishment may drive the resulting punishment
prots below zero, even if for a single period, one has to control for the non-
negativity of the discounted ow of prots over the continuation of the game
from the punishment period to doomsday. All of this requires the following
conditions to hold in a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium:
D
 
qC
  C    C   P  (8)
D
 
qP
  P    C   P  (9)
P + C
1X
t=1
t = P +
C
1    0 (10)
considering, for the moment, D
 
qP

> 0: For the moment, we shall suppose
it is. This amounts to saying that we start examining optimal (but not
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necessarily globally optimal) punishments, with conditions (8-10) referring
to the setup in Abreu (1986) up to his Lemma 17, p. 204.
Inequality (8) must be satised for the collusive path to be stable. In-
equality (9) must hold for rms to implement the optimal punishment qP ;
delivering the punishment payo¤ P ; D
 
qP

being the prots generated by
the optimal deviation q
 
qP

from the punishment qP . Condition (10) is the
participation constraint whereby the discounted continuation payo¤ cannot
be negative. Sticking to the assumption of full collusion, the two unknowns
to be determined are the critical threshold of the discount factor and the
intensity of the punishment qP :
If all rms adopt the punishment, the per-rm punishment prots are
P =
 
a  nqP   c qP (11)
while the unilateral deviation from qP is
q
 
qP

=
a  c  (n  1) qP
2
> 08 qP 2

0;
a  c
n  1

(12)
where, for future reference, we may dene (a  c) = (n  1)  qP . Whenever
the best reply in (12) is indeed positive, the prots granted by optimally
deviating from the punishment are
D
 
qP

=

a  (n  1) qP   c2
4
(13)
Now, solving (8-9) w.r.t.  and qP , one obtains
  (n+ 1)
2
16n
 A
qP  qPA 
(a  c) (3n  1)
2n (n+ 1)
(14)
with @qPA=@n < 0; for the intensity of the punishment is diluted as the number
of cartel members increases. In correspondence of the lower bound of qP in
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(14), the optimal unilateral deviation from the punishment is
q
 
qP

= max

0;
(a  c) [n (6  n)  1]
4n (n+ 1)

(15)
with
(a  c) [n (6  n)  1]
4n (n+ 1)
> 08n 2 [2; 5] (16)
In the same range of n,
p
 
q
 
qP

; qP

= a  (a  c) [n (6  n)  1]
4n (n+ 1)
  (n  1) qPA > 0 (17)
Leaving aside for a moment the fact that n is an integer, observe that
n (6  n)   1 = 0 in n = 3 + 2p2 ' 5:83. This implies that the system
of inequalities (8-10) is admissible only for n 2 [2; 5]. In this range, substi-
tuting A; qC and
q
 
qP

=
(a  c) [n (6  n)  1]
4n (n+ 1)
(18)
into (10) reveals that the participation constraint does not bite.
Moreover, A > m for all n 2 [2; 5] ; revealing that
Lemma 1 For all n 2 [2; 5] ; the stick-and-carrot punishment with D  qP  >
0 cannot be globally optimal.
Additionally, A > F for all n  10 and A > 1 for all n  14. Hence, we
must abandon the idea that the optimal deviation from the punishment de-
livers positive prots and nd a way towards the characterization of globally
optimal punishments.
4 Looking for globally optimal punishment
The nding in Lemma 1 takes us to Abreu (1986), where the value of the
discounted payo¤ ow generated by the continuation of the repeated game
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after the initial deviation from the collusive path appearing in (10) is dened
as
P +
C
1    v ( ) (19)
Abreu (1986, p. 205) says that ... there exists a lower bound  < 1
... such that for   ; v ( ) = 0: Since a rms minmax payo¤ in the
component game is zero, global optimality is clearly implied ... an interesting
feature of the optimal two-phase punishment when v ( ) = 0 is that all rms
simultaneously minmax one another in the rst phase. Then, his Theorems
18 and 19 rely upon the following argument: The only way v ( )can equal
zero and  (x1; x2) be a P.E. is  (x1) = 0 ... Hence the total output produced
by (N   1) rms must be large enough that p (N   1)x1  c; which sets a
lower bound on x1 independent of . Hence prots in the rst period must
be negative, but not so large that they cannot be recouped by a collusive
output level supportable by a zero punishment in the future.
In our model, N = n, x1 = qP ; x2 = qC ; and  (x1) = D
 
qP

. More-
over,  (x1; x2) = 
 
qP ; qC

is a symmetric strategy prole for the supergame
based on the two-phase (stick-and-carrot) punishment. Finally, P.E. stands
for perfect equilibrium.
Now, observe that the adoption of minmax strategies forever after the
deviation from the cartel path ensures v ( ) = 0 and therefore m cannot be
outperformed by any other form of punishment as this would require v ( )
becoming negative, consequently driving rms out of the supergame. The
issue is then whether there exists a subgame perfect punishment capable of
reproducing m.
For the moment, we conne our attention to n 2 [2; 5]. Abreu (1986,
p. 206) uses the same setting as ours to provide an example illustrating his
Theorems 18-19. For n 2 [2; 5], he claims that
 =
4n
(n+ 1)2
 25 (20)
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A few remarks are in order:
 To begin with, compare 25 against A to nd that
25   A = [n (6  n)  1] [n (n+ 10) + 1]
16n (n+ 1)2
> 0 (21)
meaning that, for small cartels, using v ( ) > 0 is more e¢ cient than
imposing v ( ) = 0.
 Secondly, and fairly surprising, in n = 2; 25 = 8=9 > F = 9=17: The
same ranking between 25 and F emerges for n = 3; 4.
 Thirdly, 25 is obviously decreasing in n. This would entail that enlarg-
ing the cartel makes it more stable, which goes against the acquired
wisdom intuitively sustaining the opposite.
These observations prompt for a reconstruction of the example, which
can be worked out as follows. Since the requirement is v ( ) = 0, one can
solve (10) at the margin w.r.t. , to nd
 =
4nqP
 
nqP + c  a
(2nqP + c  a)2 (22)
Then, solving (9) at the margin w.r.t. the punishment, we obtain qP =
(a  c) = (n  1) : In correspondence of this intensity of the punishment, qD  qP  =
0 = D
 
qP

(i.e., in Abreus terminology,  (x1) = 0). Moreover, simplify-
ing (22) yields 25. At this point, using these expressions for  and qP ; one
may check that (8) is satised as an inequality for all n 2 [2; 5].
This proves that solving the sub-system (8-9) and then checking (10)
is not equivalent to solving sub-system (9-10) and then checking (8). The
reason is that, if the deviation prots D
 
qP

and the continuation payo¤
are both nil, then necessarily (9) and (10) coincide, as can be easily veried
rewriting (9) as
 P    C   P , C + (1  )P  0 (23)
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which evidently coincides with (10) up to the positive constant 1= (1  ).
We are dealing with three inequalities in two unknowns,  and qP . Hence,
the reason why the two routes do not deliver the same conclusion is that,
when D
 
qP

= 0, (9) and (10) are indeed the same and therefore 25 results
from using a single condition to nd both unknowns.
For n  6, Abreus example yields
 =
(n+ 1)2
4 (n  1)2  6 (24)
This also deserves a few comments:
 Comparing m with 6; we have
m   6 = [n (n  6) + 1] [n (3n  2) + 3]
4 (n+ 1)2 (n  1)2 > 0 (25)
This would imply that the presumed optimal punishment outperforms
minmax strategies, which is impossible.
 Moreover, 6 monotonically decreases in n, with
lim
n!1
6 =
1
4
< Ajn=2 =
9
32
(26)
which would suggest that an innitely large cartel is more easily sus-
tained than the smallest cartel, which again goes against intuition and
acquired wisdom.
On the basis of Abreus (1986) Theorems 18 and 19, globally optimality
of the punishment requires v ( ) = 0 and D
 
qP

= 0; which means that
the system (8-10) becomes:
D
 
qC
  C    C   P  (27)
 P    C   P  (28)
11
P + C
1X
t=1
t = P +
C
1    0 (29)
As observed above, the last two inequalities are identical up to a positive
constant. Hence, solving (27) and (28) or (27) and (29) necessarily yields the
same pair:
  m  (n  1)
2
(n+ 1)2
qP  qPm 
(a  c)pn (pn+ 1)2
4n3
(30)
We have then shown that when (28) and (29) are equivalent, satisfying the
individual incentive to implement the optimal punishment at the margin
implies that the continuation value from that period onwards is exactly equal
to zero and replicates the e¢ ciency of the innite reversion to the minmax
strategy qm after the initial deviation from the cartel path. However, in order
for (30) to be acceptable, it must be true that D
 
qP

= 0; which, in turn,
requires q
 
qP

= 0; i.e., that the optimal deviation from the punishment be
nil. Looking at the best reply
q
 
qP

=
a  (n  1) qP   c
2
(31)
it appears that a (n  1) qP  c  0 for all qP  qP :Moreover, the resulting
price p
 
qP

= a   nqP can be lower than marginal cost but cannot drop
below zero. The latter non-negativity condition requires c  a=n: The same
constraint holds for p
 
qPm

= a nqPm; requiring c  a (
p
n  1)2 = (pn+ 1)2 ;
with
a (
p
n  1)2
(
p
n+ 1)
2 >
a
n
8n  6 (32)
Now, comparing qPm with q
P ; we obtain
Lemma 2 qPm > q
P for all n  6: Therefore, q  qP  = D  qP  = 0 for all
n  6.
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This Lemma entails two relevant consequences. The rst is that 6 < m
is clearly a mistake.1 The second, more important implication of the above
Lemma is
Proposition 3 For all n  6; the one-shot optimal punishment is qP  qPm,
delivering the same threshold m of the discount factor for the stability of full
collusion as minmax strategies repeated forever.
We may then conclude that, for n 2 [2; 5] ; the globally optimal one-shot
punishment does not exists and, if m can indeed be reached, it is the outcome
of a punishment lasting at least two periods, and possibly non-stationary (as
already illustrated in Abreu, 1988).
5 Two-period punishment
There are two alternative approaches to model a non-stationary punishment
lasting two periods. One consists in stipulating that, once again, the optimal
deviation from the punishment yields zero prots. If so, the relevant system
is
D(qC)  C 
2X
t=1
t

C   P (qPt )

(33)
 P (qP1 ) 
2X
t=1
t

C   P (qPt )

(34)
P (qP1 ) + 
P (qP2 ) +
2C
1    0 (35)
where qPt , with t = 1; 2 is the punishment in period t. Solving (33-35) w.r.t.
qP1 ; q
P
2 ; 
	
yields
qP1 = q
P
m ; q
P
2 = q
C ;  = m (36)
1We didnt succeed in reconstructing the derivation of 6 in Abreus (1986, p. 205)
example. For sure, it cannot represent the minimal theshold of the discount factor, as it
is lower than m.
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which proves that imposing D(qP1 ) = 0 replicates the above (unacceptable)
result whereby the individual output in the rst period of the punishment is
qPm and then rms revert to the cartel production in the second period of the
presumed punishment.
Hence, this approach cannot be pursued. The second approach consists
in considering
D(qP1 ) =

a  (n  1) qP1   c
2
4
> 0 (37)
together with a non-stationary punishment, as in Lambertini and Sasaki
(2002). The related system of inequalities is
D(qC)  C 
2X
t=1
t

C   P (qPt )

(38)
D(qP1 )  P (qP1 ) 
2X
t=1
t

C   P (qPt )

(39)
P (qP1 ) + 
P (qP2 ) +
2C
1    0 (40)
Condition (38) reformulates the constraint concerning the stability of the
collusive path, while (39) ensures playersincentive compatibility about the
implementation of a biperiodal punishment. The third condition prevents
players quitting the supergame. In all of them,
P (qPt ) =
 
a  2qPt   c

qPt (41)
and, in (39-40),
D(qPt ) =

a  c  (n  1) qPt
2
4
; t = 1; 2 (42)
The system (38-40) delivers four solutions w.r.t. the triple

qP1 ; q
P
2 ; 
	
;
14
of which only one is acceptable:
qP1  qPA 
(a  c) (3n  1)
2n (n+ 1)
qP2  bqP2  (a  c) [2n (n  1) + (1 + n (n  6))pn]4n2 (n  1)
  m  (n  1)
2
(n+ 1)2
(43)
On the basis of (43), one can easily establish
qP >
(a  c) (3n  1)
2n (n+ 1)
>
(a  c) [2n (n  1) + (1 + n (n  6))pn]
4n2 (n  1) (44)
for all n 2 [2; 5] ; i.e., the punishment is decreasing over time and the con-
straint about the the optimal deviation from the punishment is respected.
Moreover, plugging the triple

qP1 = q
P
A ; q
P
2 = bqP2 ;  = m	 into (40), one
nds that the constraint ensuring the rmsparticipation to the continuation
of the supergame is indeed satised at the margin, i.e., (40) holds as an
equality. Moreover, controlling for the price in the two punishment periods,
it turns out that it is strictly positive for n = 2; 3; while for n = 4; 5; a
su¢ cient condition for its non-negativity is a 2 (c; 7c] : To see this, observe
that the price levels in the two punishment periods are
p
 
qP1

=
c (3n  1)  a (n  3)
2 (n+ 1)
p
 
qP2

=
c
 
1  2pn  6n+ 2n3=2 + n2  a  1 + 2pn  6n  2n3=2 + n2
4
p
n (n  1)
(45)
Whereas p
 
qP2

> 0 for all n 2 [2; 5] ; p  qP1  may become negative at n = 4; 5
because its partial derivative w.r.t. a is negative for n = 4; 5.
The foregoing discussion can be summarised in the following:
Proposition 4 For n 2 [2; 5] ; the globally optimal punishment requires two
periods and its intensity is decreasing over time. It is admissible for all
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a 2 (c; 7c] : The resulting critical threshold of the discount factor for the
stability of full collusion is the same as under innite reversion to the minmax
strategies, m; at which v ( ) = 0.
On the basis of Propositions 3-4, we can formulate
Theorem 5 Assume a 2 (c; 7c]. In the linear Cournot supergame, there ex-
ists a globally optimal punishment path minimising the value of the stability
threshold of the discount factor for all n  2. For any cartel size, the dis-
counted payo¤ ow generated by the continuation game following the initial
deviation from the cartel path is nil. However, the structure of the globally
optimal punishment depends on cartel size:
 the punishment is one-shot (stick-and-carrot) only for n  6, in which
case it requires the optimal deviation payo¤ from the punishment to be
nil, without any restriction on market size;
 for smaller cartels, a 2 (c; 7c] is required and the optimal deviation
payo¤ from the punishment must not be nil. The punishment must be
distributed over two periods along which its severity is decreasing.
Now recall Abreus (1986, p. 205) claim Consider two-phase punish-
ments. The only way v ( ) can equal zero and  (x1; x2) be a P.E. is if
 (x1) = 0...as reported above. Our Theorem proves that the attainment
of the lowest threshold of the discount factor m does require v ( ) = 0, but
not, in general,  (x1) = 0: Indeed, for small cartels, this is not the case
because the stick-and-carrot punishment scheme does not work, global opti-
mality requiring a two-period punishment. The intuitive explanation relies
upon the fact that the slice from cartel participation decreases with cartel
size. Hence, the punishment required to stabilise a small cartel has to be
more severe than for large cartels. This, when global optimality is looked
for, entails an extension of the punishment span.
16
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have proved that global optimality in the innite repetition
of a linear Cournot game may not be granted by one-shot stick-and-carrot
strategy. Our conclusions contrast strikingly with those of Abreu (1986).
We show that globally optimal subgame perfect strategies depend on the
number of rms. For largecartels, the globally optimal one-shot punishment
exists and reproduces the same critical threshold of the discount factor as
under minmax strategies. For small cartels, global optimality cannot be
implemented via one-shot punishments, but only by means of a two-period
punishment.
Whatever is the number of rms, the example in Abreu (1986) delivers
thresholds of the discount factor which cannot be globally optimal as they do
not coincide with that delivered by the reversion to the minmax strategy. The
source of this problem is that the requirement that the payo¤ow generated
by the continuation of the supergame be nil makes two of the three incentive
compatibility constraints coincide.
Our ndings, which we have derived from the simplest possible frame-
work, might prelude to a revisitation of the large literature investigating the
impact of product di¤erentiation on cartel stability2 using Friedmans (1971)
folk theorem and the representative consumer with a preference for variety
as in Singh and Vives (1984).
2See Deneckere (1983), Majerus (1988), Ross (1992), Rothschild (1992), Lambertini
(1997) and Albæk and Lambertini (1998), inter alia.
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